DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/95.1.269, Fine, K. 2001. Against Social Kind Anti-Realism. Grounding: Toward a Theory of the “In-Virtue-of” Relation. I follow Sally Haslanger and Ron Mallon in thinking that discursively constructed kinds (i.e., kinds subject to what Ian Hacking (1996) calls ‘looping effects’) are causally mind-dependent in this sense (see Cooper 2004, Khalidi 2010, 2013, 2016; and Mallon 2003, 2016 for germane discussions of discursively constructed or ‘interactive’ kinds). The Journal of Philosophy, 109(12): 685–711. Raven, MJ. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0865-x, Hacking, I. 1An anonymous referee suggests that there may be different kinds of social kinds, and that they may depend on our mental states in a diversity of ways. 2018b. In the preceding sections, I considered two prominent ways of analyzing the relation that is supposed to obtain between social kinds and our mental states. Therefore, social kinds are merely a ‘projection’ of our thoughts onto mind-independent reality. For example, according to the collective acceptance view, something is money only if we collectively accept that some conditions (e.g., being a bill issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing) suffice for being money.12 If we collectively accept that being a bill issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing is sufficient for being money, then anything that is a bill issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing is money. But social kinds may be unreal (in some sense) for different reasons. Metaphysics, 3(1), 55–67. In other words, according to social kind anti-realism, the reason why social kinds are unreal is not simply that they are dependent; rather, it is that they are mind dependent. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Realism in literature is an approach that attempts to describe life without idealization or romantic subjectivity. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9147-2_4, Epstein, B. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. But What Are You Really? But social kind anti-realists about social kinds do not claim that our assertions about them are not truth apt. According to Thomasson, ‘the minimal core of ontological realism is the position that something exists independently of all mental states’ (2003b: 581). Hypatia, 28(4): 716–732. ), Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social Reality. Many millennia ago, there were no permanent residents because the relevant social conventions were not in place. The term was coined as an argument against a form of realism Dummett saw as 'colorless reductionism'. As such, it does not support social kind anti-realism. It’s not … Tinkering with the details of the proposed modal-existential relation does nothing to address this general problem. I think that it is plausible to interpret Searle’s constitutive rules as supplying sufficient conditions for the existence of instances of social kinds (i.e., some individual being a member of the kind in question), and so I think that MD1 is faithful to Searle’s view. Realism/Anti-Realism in 20th-Century Literature. I consider several ways of accomplishing the Dependence Task. Ian Hacking (1999, p. Kinds are individuated by their essential properties.21 Suppose that a kind, K, is essentially F. If K is essentially F, then any kind that is not F is not K. It follows that K is necessarily F. If K is necessarily F, then we have no control over whether K is F, for we have no control over which properties K has necessarily. However, this is not a substantive metaphysical disagreement; it is a terminological one. 6One option is to define realism and anti-realism are defined in terms of mind-independence and mind-dependence respectively. 41–55. According to this interpretation of MD2, a social kind, K, is mind-dependent when we determine the general essence of being K, i.e., what it is to be K. How do we determine the essential properties of social kinds? Indeed, the relevant figurative descriptions are common to many discussions of realism and anti-realism in the philosophical literature. 57–68. The sentences and ideas are in your mind (and mine, as I write them), but the computer, the server, the pixels, and your eyeballs are all real objects in the real world.This is the position of philosophical realism: the view that whatever we perceive is real, truly out there. 55–67. In other words, MD2 does not accomplish the Dependence Task. This is because proponents of social kind anti-realism do not argue that social kinds fail to be real because our thoughts cause them to exist. Literary realism does not directly refer to or represent reality, but a perception of it. 2008b. I argue that the modal-existential relation fails to accomplish the Dependence Task and that the ground-theoretic relation fails to accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. Second, the question of whether there are distinctions between different kinds of social kinds is orthogonal to the question of whether social kind anti-realism is well founded. However, she maintains that ‘a more robust realism is…often thought to require that there be a world that not only exists, but also has a certain structure independently of the mental’ (2003b: 582). ), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology. On the surface, literary realism would appear to operate by rules set by the "real world", grounded in physical and social reality, and, significantly, outside of … New York: Routledge. The actual world, w@, is represented by
(Einheuser 2006: 462–463). Zack, N. 2002. 1996. No scientist has ever seen a black hole, but theory predicts that they exist. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00309.x. First, when evaluating modal claims we sometimes hold our linguistic and conceptual conventions fixed and consider possible worlds that differ from the actual world with respect to which properties are instantiated. 2See Gilbert (1989); Hacking (1991, 1996, 2002); Hayek (1943); Khalidi (2010); Ruben (1989); Searle (1995, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2014); Thomasson (2003a, 2003b); Tuomela (2007). In the possible world, w′, we have the concept MONEY2, which refers to K2. Thus, in what follows I consider only non-causal relations of mind-dependence. Dordrecht: Springer. Mills argues that individuals acquire the property of being black or being white in virtue of the fact that we intersubjectively judge them to be black or white (Mills 1998). pp. This is what I intend to do in what follows. Against Social Kind Anti-Realism. In: Lawson, H and Appignanesi, L (eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Infallibilism and Human Kinds. In the actual world, w@, we have the concept MONEY1, which refers to K1. More generally, 17thcentury protagonists of the new sciences advocated a metaphysical picture: nature is not what it appears to our senses—it is a world of objects (Descartes’ matter-extension, Boyle’s corpuscles, Huygens’ atoms, and s… DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/met.30. In this section, I want to reconsider MD2 by appeal to a framework devised by Iris Einheuser to defend what she calls ‘conventionalism,’ the view that ‘some aspects of reality depend on our conventions’ (2006: 460). It does not matter whether the relevant mental states are collective or individualistic. If conferred properties are response-dependent properties, and response-dependent properties are less than fully real, then this is a reason to believe that conferred property kinds are less than fully real as well. Metaphysics, 3(1), pp.55–67. Most often, the sense of reality that social kinds are supposed to lack is characterized figuratively. 41–66. Lanham: Roman & Littlefield Publishing, Inc. pp. I have already suggested one social kind that is plausibly defined in terms of a conferred property, namely, being a permanent resident. 4Social kind anti-realism is a prominent view in the literature, but it is not the only view. Others also deny that causal mind-dependence entails anti-realism (see Egan 2006, Haslanger 1995, Khalidi 2016, and Rosen 1994). In: Manley, D, Chalmers, DJ and Wasserman, R (eds. Several of the essays collected in Haslanger (2012), as well as Guala (2014), Khalidi (2010, 2013, 2015, 2016); Mallon (2003, 2016); and Root (2000) defend the thesis that social kinds are mind-dependent, but not that they are unreal. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/55.1.73, Egan, A. The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. 2013. Thomasson says this quite explicitly: ‘On this understanding, denying a relative ontological realist thesis regarding things of kind K should not automatically be equated with denying that there are entities of kind K, or else we could not distinguish, e.g., conceptualism or constructivism from eliminativism’ (2003b, 582 fn. Those are very quick takes on the two views and should not be satisfactory in and of themselves to anyone. Essence and Modality. First, as I argue in section 2.2, social kind anti-realists typically do not (and need not) accept the claim that grounded entities are unreal. Dispositional Theories of Value. For example, it is not the case that racism and recessions exist only if we have thoughts about racism and recessions. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12220, Root, M. 2000. 2003b. Thomasson argues that the way in which social kinds like money depend on our mental states means that their boundaries are not independent of our concepts and representations in this way. That is, it does not matter whether the relevant mental states are acceptances, beliefs or something else. Ethics, 54(1): 1–13. ), Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Koslicki, K. 2013. Instead, proponents of social kind anti-realism argue that the relation that obtains between social kinds and our mental states (the Dependence Task), and which undermines their reality (the Anti-Realist Task), is a non-causal relation of some kind. My argument in this section will parallel the argument given in the previous one: for any kind, K, if being F is essential to being K, then, K is necessarily F. If K is necessarily F, then it is not in our power to determine whether K is F—a fortiori it is not in our power to determine whether K is F by the way in which we use our words and concepts. Dordrecht: Klewer. Another prominent use of the word ‘real’ corresponds to the idea of fundamentality. ), Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence. Author has 2.8K answers and 40.6M answer views. In: Schmit, FF (ed. Call this the Anti-Realist Task. Thus, I maintain that social kind anti-realism is not a well-defined view. To defend their view, social kind anti-realists must accomplish two tasks. Three Kinds of Social Kinds. For example, the nature and content of the relevant mental states does not make a difference. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4, Ásta. The Categories We Live By. (Internationale Forschungen Zur Allgemeinen Und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft) (English and French Edition) (French) Bilingual Edition by Christine Baron (Editor), Manfred Engel (Editor) ISBN-13: 978-9042031159. Philosophical Studies, 174(10): 2449–2465. Thanks to an anonymous referee for making this connection to Ásta’s anti-realist account of essentiality. ), Blackness Visible. According to MD2, social kinds do not exist ‘out there’ independently of what we may think about them. Moreover, social conventions may change such that bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing cease to be money. According to MD2, it is not merely that the existence or instantiation of social kinds is conventional. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199892631.001.0001, Hayek, F. 1943. Rather, the main targets of my critique are those philosophers who maintain that a social kind, K, exists but is not real. Ground. However, Ásta also notes that her view differs from conventionalism in important ways (144–147). 2018. Bellarmine advocated an antirealist interpretation of Copernicus’s heliocentrism—as a useful instrument that saved the phenomena—whereas Galileo advocated a realist interpretation—the planets really do orbit the sun. Searle, J. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195396171.001.0001, Searle, J. As such, social kind anti-realism is not well justified: anyone who wishes to defend social kind anti-realism must provide an alternative explanation of how social kinds depend on our mental states in a way that impugns their reality. In: O’Leary-Hawthorne, J and Michael, M (eds. Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind. The question of whether moral realism enjoys an explanatory advantage over anti-realism is in part a question of whether objective moral facts are needed to explain anything. Oxford University Press. For example, on the assumption that numbers exist necessarily, marriage exists only if the number two exists. 17–26. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(1): 97–119. Specifically, someone is a permanent resident of say, the United States, because the appropriate individual(s) at the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) agree or declare that she is authorized to live and work in the United States permanently, although she is not a U.S. citizen. Social Construction, Social Roles, and Stability. In general, the fact that some facts (social or otherwise) are grounded in facts about our mental states (collective or otherwise) does not establish that the former are not real. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19952324, Haslanger, S. 2012. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/63.1.89, Khalidi, MA. Second, in the idiom of grounding, social kind anti-realism is the thesis that social kinds are not real because they are grounded in our mental states. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115613494, Fine, K. 1994. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Ásta. ), Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate. The idea that response-dependent properties like being red do not have the same metaphysical status as response-independent properties like being hexagonal is a tempting one. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7: 131–193. The poet and writer Heinrich Heine tried in his books to accept the world as it is instead of trying to escape from it. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67(3): 580–609. Against Social Kind Anti-Realism. For instance, consider the claim that water is necessarily H2O. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0045, Koslicki, K. 2012. In: Zalta, EN (ed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(4): 687–701. On What Grounds What. 21–64. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/95.1.269, Fine, K. 2012. Definition of anti-realism. According to MD2, the essential properties of social kinds depend on our conventions—in particular, they depend on our linguistic or conceptual conventions. 9One species of mind-dependence that I will not consider is causal mind-dependence. Bliss, R and Trogdon, K. 2016. Philosophy of Science, 67(3): 628–639. 26Many discussions of response-dependence concern response-dependent concepts, see Johnston (1989), Pettit (1991), Wedgwood (1997), and Wright (1992). To defend conventionalism, Einheuser calls attention to two ways in which modal claims can be evaluated. As such, it fails to support social kind anti-realism. Though it is tempting to regard conferred properties, and conferred property kinds, as metaphysically second rate, this is not yet a reason to believe that they are unreal. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.x, Burge, T. 1986. So, even granting the assumption that conferred properties are ontologically subjective, this does not demonstrate that they are not real.25, The second way of capturing the idea that conferred property kinds are not real is by appeal to the idea that conferred properties are response-dependent (Ásta 2008, Passinsky forthcoming). The interest in Realism led to a movement called Naturalism. The Construction of Social Reality. However, MD2 says something much stronger than this. »magic realism«) challenged Western modernity and its constructivist epistemology. I surveyed several ways of defining the relation that is supposed to obtain between social kinds and our mental states and argued that each proposal either fails to accomplish the Dependence Task or fails to accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. 1989. 2018a. This is what I hope to show in this paper: being mind-dependent does not entail being unreal. In: Margolis, E and Laurence, S (eds. “Against Social Kind Anti-realism”. Philosophical Studies, 175(1): 241–260. And Amie Thomasson argues that many social kinds are not real because they exist and have their nature in virtue of our thoughts about them (Thomasson 2003b).3 Call this view social kind anti-realism: Social kinds are not real because they are mind-dependent.4, In what follows, I argue that social kind anti-realism is not well founded.5. For example, we determine which properties are essential to money by the way in which we use the word ‘money’ and apply the concept MONEY.20. ), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter). It is possible that something is F only if Y exists, but being F does not depend on Y. 186–305. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00303.x, Ásta. I will argue that, even if MD1-G accomplishes the Dependence Task, it does not accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. 97–122. Meaning and Reference. Call this the Dependence Task. In Hoeltje, M, Schnieder, B and Steinberg, A (eds. 19A similar claim is also defended by Ásta (2008b), who argues that we determine which properties are essential to an object. His work is . Realism in literature was a movement which started in Germany. 14Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. As such, it does not support social kind anti-realism. Metaphysical Grounding. Why Hacking is Wrong about Human Kinds. Literary realism, in particular, introduced a new way of writing and a new generation of authors whose influence can still be seen in American literature and English literature to this day. For a brief discussion comparing such anti-realism to its opposite, realism, see (Okasha 2002, ch. 1995. Therefore, thesis that we determine which properties are essential to social kinds like money by the way in which we use social kind terms or concepts—even when regimented by Einheuser’s two-dimensional framework—is false. For example, the essence of Queen Elizabeth II (say, her biological origin) specifies what it is to be Queen Elizabeth II, as opposed to Queen Elizabeth I, or Queen Victoria. The properties of being a commonly used medium of exchange and being a measure and store of value are essential to kind, K1. Anti-realistic theatre is any form of theatre which rejects realism. According to social kind anti-realism, social kinds (e.g., money) exist but their ontological status is diminished in some way. New York: The Free Press. A kind, K, is water only if K is H2O.23 In other words, water is necessarily H2O. Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. The observation of vast clouds of matter swirling around super-dense objects leads many physicists to state that they should be regarded as truth. Following Einheuser, call the raw material the world provides—that is, the manifold of relevantly mind-independent properties—the substratum (Einheuser 2006: 461). 5Khalidi (2016) considers several varieties of mind-dependence that are importantly different from those I consider in what follows. How We Divide the World. But those who defend social kind anti-realism do not argue that social entities are non-existent.8 Rather, social kind anti-realists are what Gideon Rosen call ‘modern idealists’—that is, anti-realists who admit that the allegedly unreal entities in question exist (Rosen 1994: 289). Some of the relations I consider are explicitly defended in the social ontology literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. Similarly, John Searle argues that social kinds are not real because they “only are what they are, because that is what we believe that they are” (Searle 2007: 4). See more. 19th-20th Century Realism and Anti-Realism ... -Chekhov started his literary career writing short stories to . On Ásta’s view, if those with standing (e.g., social influence or power) in C perceive that S has the property of identifying as a woman, then the property of being a woman is conferred on S in C. If some social kinds are conferred property kinds, then MD3 accomplishes the Dependence Task. 37–80. The Question of Realism. The Realism vs. Anti-Realism Debate The mid-1980's saw a transformation of the debate over "scientific rationality" which had been unleashed by Kuhn's perceived challenge to the traditional claim that scientific belief is determined by evidence and reasoning. Christine Baron / Manfred Engel: Introduction / Introduction, Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft Online, Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft, Réalisme et antiréalisme Une généalogie complexe, Égalité de la mimesis et de l’antimimesis Quelques notes sur le paradoxe de l’institution de l’œuvre, »Laquelle est la vraie?« La parole hybride de la poésie, Forms and Functions of Anti-Realism in the Literature of High Modernism (Woolf, Proust, Kafka), Anti-Realism and the »Livre de peintre« From Symbolism to Surrealism, »À la recherche de la réalité perdue« Ambiguous Alliances between Literature and Photography (P. Härtling, C. Nooteboom, M. Vargas Llosa, M. Beyer), Gilles Deleuze and Italian Neorealism The Irruption of the Virtual, Social Action as Neo-Realistic Discourse in Níkos Kazantzákis’s The Last Temptation of Christ (1960), Realism and Fantasy in Novels by Kubin, Raspail, and Cărtărescu, Magic and Realism The Tribal Imagination in Louise Erdrich’s Novels, La littérature romanesque d’Afrique noire francophone entre réalisme, postcolonialisme et postmodernisme, Realism as Efficacy On the Tectonics of Texts in the Web, The Stories of Park Ji-Won Pragmatic Realism Directed against the Confucian Nobility in 18th-Century Korea, Select Bibliography / Bibliographie sélectionnée, Literature and Cultural Studies E-Books Online, Collection 2010. ), Varieties of Dependence Munich: Philosophia Verlag. For ease of exposition, I will treat grounding as a relational predicate, and I will take the relata of the grounding relation to be facts: (MD1-G) A kind, K, is mind-dependent =df The fact that an entity, x, is K is grounded in the fact that we collectively accept that some conditions, c1…cn, suffice for being K.17. Dordrecht: Springer. ), Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Consider: the fact that I know that Sacramento is the capital of California is (partially) grounded in the fact that I believe that Sacramento is the capital of California. Thus, MD2 does not identify the way in which social kinds depend on our mental states. As such, anyone who wishes to defend social kind anti-realism must provide an alternative explanation of how social kinds depend on our mental states in a way that impugns their reality. pp. According to Ásta, ‘the property of being an essential property of an object—essentiality—is conferred. Metaphysics 3 (1): 55–67. Thus, MD1 does not accomplish the Dependence Task. Lenham: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. With respect to each relation, I argue that either it fails to accomplish the Dependence Task, or it fails to accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.